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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the LIBOR rigging scandal broke into the public consciousness in mid2012, every day’s news seems to bring with it reports of new litigation and
regulatory actions. The effects of the debacle will likely play out in courts around
the world for years.
The goal of this article is to present the reader with a general overview of the
LIBOR: its genesis and development, how and why London bankers manipulated
the LIBOR, the liability of implicated parties, criminal penalties, the impact of
criminal penalties on director and officer insurance carriers, and what the future
holds for the LIBOR.
II. THE LONDON INTERBANK OFFERED RATE (THE LIBOR)
The LIBOR developed in response to “rising demand around the 1960s for
‘Euro’ currencies—offshore, stateless, and often in dollars—that swept London
and allowed companies and countries to borrow, deposit and repay while dodging
1
domestic regulation and taxes.”.”

* Michael R. Koblenz’s practice areas include Litigation and general corporate law; commodities,
securities, antitrust, administrative proceedings, arbitrations, director’s and officer’s liability cases, real
estate, entertainment law, and regulatory matters. The practice includes hedge funds, mergers,
acquisitions, and private and public offerings. Mr. Koblenz has represented commodities futures
exchanges, clearing organizations, and broker/dealers as well as individual traders and brokers, and
advice on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Having served as a federal prosecutor with the United
States Department of Justice, Mr. Koblenz also engages in the defense of white-collar criminal cases
involving securities, commodities, antitrust, telemarketing, and postal fraud.
Mr. Koblenz has defended a number of class action lawsuits over the years; including but not limited to
class actions brought against New York Commodities Exchanges, brokers and precious metals
companies. He is currently defending a class action suit in California with co-counsel. Mr. Koblenz is a

282

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. VI:II

Geopolitical forces, especially the Vietnam War, coincided with the emergence of
global trade imbalances and restrictive legislation in the U.S. and resulted in the
unexpected and sudden creation of the Eurodollar market in London in the
1960s . . . . It was from this start that syndicated lending and capital markets
2
recycled offshore dollars using floating interest rates based on [the] L[IBOR].

At the time, no uniform index for determining the true interbank or reference
3
rate existed.
For each [syndicated] loan, then, reference banks that were deemed representative
of a cross section of the syndicate—or, for more neutrality, banks outside the
syndicate—were chosen by the parties. The rates at which these reference banks
could borrow would be aggregated to form the ‘interbank rate’ for the purpose of
4
the loan.

However, “[t]his method was cumbersome, and offered multiple
opportunities for manipulation. This was especially true in London, where an
older banking culture of gentlemanly capitalism prevailed, and where favors and
5
family connections were still central to a bank’s success.”
Many overseas banks had offices in London, which quickly became the
home of the loosely regulated European currencies. A handful of enterprising
London bankers organized several London banks “into consortia, sharing the risks
for massive syndicated loans funded through a series of short-term deposits based
6
on floating interest rates.”
Minos Zombanakis, who ran the London branch of Manufacturers Hanover,
created the formula that would become the LIBOR. Within each syndicate, a
group of “big reference banks . . . would report their funding costs shortly before a
loan rollover date. The weighted average, rounded to the nearest 1/8th percent
7
plus a ‘spread’ for profit, became the price of the loan for the next period.”
However,

Registered Legal Practitioner in the DIFC Courts (Dubia).
* Kenneth M. Labbate is a partner in the New York office of Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass. He
concentrates his practice in the defense of professional liability claims and has successfully defended
various professionals including directors and officers, accountants, attorneys, insurance agents and
brokers, real estate agents, brokers, appraisers and other miscellaneous professionals.
* Carrie Turner is an associate in the New York City office of Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass.
Prior to joining Mound Cotton, Ms. Turner clerked for one year for the Honorable Boyce F. Martin, Jr.
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. She received her J.D. from Boston
University School of Law where she was the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston University School of Law
Public Interest Law Journal.
1
Kirstin Ridley & Huw Jones, Insight: A Greek Banker, the Shah and the Birth of Libor, REUTERS
(Aug. 7, 2012, 9:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/08/us-banking-libor-changeidUSBRE87702320120808.
2
Ridley & Jones, supra note 1.
3
Sean Vanatta, Libor’s Risks Emerged from Clubby London Banking Culture, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
14, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/libor-s-risks-emerged-from-clubbylondon-banking-culture.html.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Ridley & Jones, supra note 1.
7
Vanatta, supra note 3.
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[t]he use of the interbank rate shifted interest-rate risks to borrowers, and in the
turbulent climate of the late 1970s financial institutions developed new tools to
offset these risks. The most important of these was the interest-rate swap, a form of
derivatives contract that allowed a party to hedge differences in short- and long8
term interest rates.

The many possible interest rates “made the development of a transparent
market difficult, because each swap contract might have different terms and be
linked to different reference banks. Nonuniformity was a significant problem in a
9
market already estimated to be worth several trillion dollars in the mid-1980s.”
“The rise of the derivatives market generally, and interest-rate swaps in particular,
10
thus created the need for a more systematic index.”
Furthermore, London banks were still somewhat skeptical about investing in
the new instruments due to the necessity of bartering an underlying rate prior to
11
entering into the new contracts.
The banks turned to the British Bankers’
Association (“BBA”), an industry trade association whose main job is to lobby on
12
banks’ behalf and represent the banking industry. The banks requested that the
13
BBA devise a benchmark to act as a reference point for the new instruments.
The rate was intended to “facilitate[] the operation of markets, and ma[k]e
14
benchmarking more transparent and objective.”
In October 1984 the BBA—working with other parties such as the Bank of
England—established various working parties, which eventually culminated in the
15
production of the BBAIRS terms, the BBA standard for Interest Swap rates.
From 1986 until 1998, banks submitted their rate quotes daily to the BBA LIBOR
process by answering the question, “[a]t what rate do you think interbank term
deposits will be offered by one prime bank to another prime bank for a reasonable
16
market size today at 11 am [London time]?” In 1998, the Foreign Exchange and
17
Money Markets Committee, an independent committee of market participants

8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/historicalperspective (last visited on Mar. 29, 2013).
12
David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of Libor, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.
11,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443847404577631404235329424.html. According to
the BBA’s website, as of July, 2012, the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee had “sole
responsibility for all aspects of the functioning and development of [BBA LIBOR].” Landon Thomas,
Jr., Trade Group for Bankers Regulates a Key Rate, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/business/global/the-gentlemens-club-that-sets-libor-is-called-intoquestion.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. That committee is composed largely of bankers and financial
professionals. Id. The chairman of this committee is a representative from a panel of banks including
some of the world’s biggest institutions like Barclays, Citigroup, and UBS. Id. This committee
submitted the rates that become the LIBOR average. Id.
13
Historical Perspective, supra note 11.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Liam Vaughan, Secret Libor Committee Clings to Anonymity Following Scandal, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/secret-libor-committee-clings-toanonymity-after-rigging-scandal.html. The identities of the members of this committee, representatives
9
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that oversees the LIBOR, decided that “a universal definition of a prime bank
could no longer be given,” and that banks needed to link the figures that they
18
reported to their own market activity, “rather than [to] a hypothetical entity.”
Banks were required, in submitting rates, to answer the question “at what rate
could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter19
bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 a[.]m.[]?” “[The BBA]
has overseen the process ever since, even as the club of gentlemen bankers making
syndicated loans in the City of London evolved into the opaque and impersonal
20
multitrillion-dollar interbank market.”
The LIBOR has become integrated into a majority of the world’s financial
21
products, and currently provides the reference point for nearly all interest rate
22
derivatives and variable rate loans available in the financial markets.
It is
currently calculated for fifteen different loan durations, ranging from overnight to a
year, and in ten currencies, including the pound, the dollar, the euro, and the
23
Swedish krona. The LIBOR rates “[are] used as a benchmark to set payments on
about $800 trillion-worth of financial instruments, ranging from complex interestrate derivatives to simple mortgages. The number determines the global flow of
24
billions of dollars each year.”
The rates signal a bank’s health to financial
markets, rising when banks are in trouble, and create the basis for payments on
trillions of dollars in corporate debt, home mortgages, and financial contracts
25
world-wide. Moreover, the impact of even small rate shifts can be critical. “A
small increase in [the] LIBOR can make a big difference for borrowers. For
example, an extra 0.3 percentage points would add about $100 to the monthly
payment on a $500,000, adjustable-rate mortgage, or $300,000 in annual interest
26
costs for a company with $100 million in floating-rate debt.”
Because of its
pervasiveness in, and significance for, the financial markets, the rate has come to
27
be known as “the world’s most important number.”
28
29
Currently, member banks report their LIBOR submissions each morning
from the world’s largest banks, are not public knowledge. Id. In the past, the committee met in London
at an undisclosed location every two months to review the LIBOR rate. Id.
18
See Historical Perspective, supra note 11.
19
Id.
20
Thomas, Jr., supra note 12.
21
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12.
22
The Rotten Heart of Finance: The LIBOR Scandal, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281 [hereinafter The Rotten Heart of Finance]; see also FIN.
STABILITY
OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL,
2012
ANNUAL
REPORT
56,
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/2012report/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
23
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINAL NOTICE TO BANK 6 (2012), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf
24
The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 22.
25
Carrick Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120831164167818299.html.
26
Id.
27
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12. According to Enrich and Colchester, this description of the
LIBOR has popped up repeatedly in lawsuits regarding the rate’s alleged manipulation. Id.
28
The BBA represents over 200 banks. Member List, BBA, http://www.bba.org.uk/aboutus/member-list (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (including a list of members).
29
Other rates include the EURIBOR, TIBOR and STIBOR, The European Union, Tokyo and
Singapore’s benchmark rates.
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to the BBA and European Banking Federation (“EBF”), respectively. The BBA
and EBF require that reporting banks use their subjective judgments in determining
30
the submitted rates ; therefore, the accuracy of the LIBOR and EURIBOR, as a
measure of interest rates, relies upon the accuracy of the subjective judgment of the
31
individual reporting banks.
Derivatives traders are strictly prohibited from
32
considering their own financial positions in exercising their subjective judgment.
Thomson Reuters, on behalf of the BBA and EBF, then collates the submissions,
33
calculates the final benchmark rates, and publishes the daily rates.
III. “THIS IS THE WAY YOU PULL OFF DEALS LIKE THIS”

34

According to the United States Financial Stability Oversight Council
35
36
(“FSOC”) and the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”),
two regulatory bodies charged with investigating alleged market manipulation, as
early as 2005 evidence surfaced that the major global financial and banking
services company, Barclays Bank PLC (“Barclays”), was falsifying its reported
EURIBOR rates, and, to a lesser extent, its LIBOR rates, at the request of its own
37
derivatives traders and other banks.
“[I]nterest rate swap traders . . . regularly requested that . . . Barclays’
employee(s) responsible for determining and [setting] Barclays’ daily LIBOR and
EURIBOR [rates]” adjust the rates or submit specific rates in order to alter the
38
daily published LIBOR or EURIBOR. Barclays’ traders also “coordinated with
30

FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 6.
See id. at 22–23.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 7. The highest and lowest rates are excluded in determining the final benchmark rates. Id.
34
This is a comment made by one trader to another via instant message on March 19, 2007, after
the final benchmark EURIBOR rates were published, indicating that the traders involved considered
their strategy to manipulate the EURIBOR successful. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 22. In
another broadly publicized exchange, a Barclays’ derivatives trader told a trader from another bank with
regard to a three-month dollar LIBOR, “duuuude . . . what’s up with ur guys 34.5 3m fix . . . tell him to
get it up.” Id. at 20. Other traders made statements such as “We have an unbelievably large set on
Monday (the IMM). We need a really low 3m fix, it could potentially cost a fortune. Would really
appreciate any help.” Id. at 12. “Noonish? Whos going to put my low fixings in? hehehe.” Id. These
are only a few of the many communications that reveal a long practice of rate-rigging among traders.
See also, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and Imposing
Remedial Sanctions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (June 27, 2012),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/
enfbarclaysorder062712.pdf.
35
The FSOC, established under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, monitors the stability of the United States’ financial system. Financial Stability Oversight
Council, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx
(last updated Oct. 22, 2012). The FSOC “is charged with identifying [threats] to the financial stability
of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of
the United States’ financial system.” Id.
36
“The [FSA] is an independent non-governmental body [in the United Kingdom] given statutory
powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.” Who Are We?, FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who (last updated May 17, 2012). The FSA is “accountable to Treasury
Ministers and, through them, [to] Parliament.” Id. The FSA’s job is to “provide full information for
firms, consumers and others about our objectives, plans, policies and rules. . . .” Id.
37
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 2.
38
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 2–3.
31
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39

traders at other banks” “in attempts to manipulate [rates].”
“Between January
2005 and June 2009, Barclays derivatives traders made a total of 257 requests to
40
fix L[IBOR] and E[URIBOR] rates . . . .”
In September 2007, depositors made a run on Northern Rock, a bank in the
United Kingdom, making Northern Rock the first “casualty” in what became the
41
Media news-sources worldwide speculated
global financial crisis of 2007–08.
whether banks had adequate liquidity, focusing on the LIBOR and EURIBOR as
42
the measurement of a bank’s ability to borrow funds. Media sources identified
Barclays as having especially high LIBOR submissions at the beginning of the
43
crisis, prompting market speculation that Barclays was at risk.
In an effort to
deflect negative media attention, Barclays’ senior treasury managers instructed
their subordinates to reduce Barclays’ LIBOR submissions, coining a phrase “head
above the parapet” to describe Barclays’ practice of altering the LIBOR to bring it
44
relatively close to submissions by other banks.
Between September 2007 and
May 2009, Barclays continued to manipulate its LIBOR submissions in an attempt
45
to make Barclays look healthier and increase Barclays’ ability to raise funds.
By 2007, Barclays’ scheme had begun to unravel. In November 2007,
various Barclays’ compliance officers contacted the FSA to express concern about
46
the rates set by both Barclays and other banks. By 2008, the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (“New York Fed”) also received calls, including a call from a
banking insider who told the Fed that, “I think the problem is that the market so
47
desperately wants [the] libors down it’s actually putting wrong rates in.” In April
2008, when a New York Fed official questioned a Barclays’ employee about its
reported rates, the employee admitted that Barclays had been manipulating rates in
order to avoid the stigma of reporting rates either higher or lower than other
48
reporting banks. On April 16, 2008, the Wall Street Journal published an article
that opened, “[o]ne of the most important barometers of the world’s financial
health could be sending false signals . . . . The growing suspicions about
L[IBOR]’s veracity suggest that banks’ troubles could be worse than they’re
49
willing to admit.”
According to a Bank of England memorandum, the BBA responded to the
Wall Street Journal article “by sending a memo to banks reminding them to

39

Id.
Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013, 6:15 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255; see FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 11.
41
See
The
Bank
That
Failed,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
20,
2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/9832838.
42
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 3.
43
Mark Gilbert, Barclays Takes a Money Market Beating, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2007),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8uEKKBYY7As.
44
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 20.
45
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 3.
46
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 21–22.
47
Transcript of Phone Call between Barclays Employee and Analyst in the Markets Group of the
New York Fed (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/
2012/libor/October_24_2008_transcript.pdf.
48
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 22.
49
Mollenkamp, supra note 25.
40
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‘submit honest rates’” and launching what BBA executives referred to as a “charm
50
offensive” for the benefit of its investors and journalists. Other members of the
51
BBA suggested that the BBA should no longer be responsible for the LIBOR. At
an April 25, 2008 meeting with officials at the Bank of England, Angela Knight,
Chief Executive Officer of the BBA, argued that the LIBOR “had become too big
52
for her organization to manage.”
Despite Ms. Knight’s concerns, regulators
53
resisted taking a greater role in overseeing the LIBOR. BBA member banks also
resisted ceding control, BBA executives arguing with one another whether they
54
should continue the “lucrative business” of managing the LIBOR. In mid-May
of 2008, the BBA held a meeting of the Foreign Exchange & Money Markets
Committee, a panel charged with making decisions about the LIBOR, in which
BBA officials agreed to deal with banks with artificially low LIBOR data, by “just
55
picking up the phone . . . and hav[ing] a conversation behind closed doors.”
By May of 2008, the New York Fed had briefed United States Treasury
56
Department senior officials regarding the suspected rate manipulation. In early
June of 2008, Timothy Geithner, then-head of the New York Fed, sent the Bank of
England’s governor, Sir Mervyn King, a list of recommendations regarding how to
57
tackle the LIBOR’s credibility issue.
Ms. Knight, upon learning of Mr.
Geithner’s proposals, emailed a top Bank of England official, Paul Tucker,
informing him of the proposals and urging Mr. Tucker to join the New York Fed in
58
59
developing oversight panels. Mr. Tucker declined.
Throughout the following months, regulators investigated Barclays’
60
Barclays
submissions in an attempt to address the LIBOR credibility issues.
continued to deny that it had falsified rate submissions. When the BBA issued a
draft document to banks in November of 2008 regarding procedures for setting the
LIBOR rates, and requiring audits of all submissions, Barclays refused to adapt its
61
procedures.
As late as November 2009, Barclays had no specific system or
62
controls in place relating to its LIBOR and EURIBOR submission process.
When BBA staffers pitched a plan to clean up the LIBOR to industry executives,

50

Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See New York Fed Responds to Congressional Request for Information on Barclays – LIBOR
Matter, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July 13, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
news/markets/2012/Barclays_LIBOR_Matter.html; see also, Samuel Chen & Matt Raskin, Recent
Concerns Regarding LIBOR’s Credibility, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (May 20, 2008), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libor/MarketSource_
Report_May202008.pdf.
57
Cheyenne Hopkins & Caroline Salas Gage, Geithner Sent BOE’s King Libor Revamp
Recommendations in 2008, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012, 6:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-07-13/geithner-proposed-libor-changes-in-2008-memo-to-bank-of-england.html.
58
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12.
59
Id. The New York Fed later decided not to assist in cleaning up the LIBOR. Id.
60
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 34, at 22–25.
61
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 23, at 32–35.
62
Id.
51
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staffers reported getting the impression that the banks, which paid most of the
63
BBA’s costs, wanted the LIBOR kept in-house where they could influence it.
64
Consequently, the BBA’s plan was shelved.
By the spring of 2012, United States’ and the United Kingdom’s
investigators had uncovered substantial evidence that Barclays and several other
65
66
unnamed banks had tried to manipulate the LIBOR. In June 2012, following an
67
extensive investigation, Barclays finally admitted to misconduct.
The FSA
68
imposed a £59.5 million ($92.8 million) penalty on Barclays. On June 27, 2012,
Barclays agreed to pay a $360 million fine to settle charges brought against it by
the United States Department of Justice and the United States Commodity Futures
69
Trading Commission (“CFTC”). On July 2, 2012, Barclays’ chairman, Marcus
Agius, Chief Executive Officer, Robert Diamond, and Chief Operating Officer,
70
Jerry del Missier, resigned amid allegations of misconduct.
IV. THE GATHERING STORM

71

A. Legal Actions and Government Investigations
72

In July 2012, the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office launched a
criminal investigation into the LIBOR scandal, investigating a total of eighteen
banks including Citigroup, Inc., Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, UBS AG,

63

Enrich & Colchester, supra note 12.
Id.
65
The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 22.
66
Id.
67
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions
for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160
Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
68
Jill Treanor, Barclays Fined £290m as Bid to Manipulate Interest is Exposed, GUARDIAN, (June
27, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/27/barclays-chief-bob-diamond-bonus-fine.
69
Jenna Greene & Jan Wolfe, Barclays Agrees to Pay $360 Million for Manipulating Interest
Rates, N.Y. L. J. (June 29, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=
1202561164644&Barclays_Agrees_to_Pay_360_Million_for_Manipulating_Interest_Rates&slreturn=2
0120715013406.
70
Halah Touryalai, Libor Cleanup: Barclays Names David Walker New Chairman, FORBES (Aug.
9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/08/09/libor-cleanup-work-barclays-namesdavid-walker-new-chairman. According to David Enrich and Dana Cimilluca, Barclays found notes of
a phone call between senior Bank of England official, Paul Tucker, and Barclays’ Robert Diamond.
David Enrich & Dana Cimilluca, Missteps Doomed Barclays’ Leaders, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303612804577528852646272314.html. “According
to Mr. Diamond’s notes of the call . . . Mr. Tucker told Mr. Diamond that, ‘it did not always need to be
the case that [Barclays] appeared as high as [it has] recently.” Id. “Mr. Diamond passed the notes
along to [Jerry] del Missier” who, according to Barclays, “interpreted the . . . conversation as . . .
instruction[s] to understate the bank’s LIBOR submissions” and, according to Barclays “told deputies to
do just that.” Id. “Mr. Tucker has denied that this was his intended message.” Id; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Robert Diamond’s Next Life, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/magazine/robert-diamonds-next-life.html?pagewanted=all.
71
The Gathering Storm is the title of Winston Churchill’s first volume in his six-volume history of
World War II.
72
Jill Treanor, Serious Fraud Office Close to Criminal Charges over Libor Rigging Scandal,
GUARDIAN (July 30, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jul/30/serious-fraud-office-liborrigging.
64
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ICAP PLC, Lloyds Banking Group PLC, and Deutsche Bank AG. The CFTC
and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States simultaneously
74
conducted civil probes into banking activity regarding the LIBOR rigging.
In June 2012, Barclays reached a settlement with investigators, and paid
75
more than $450 million in fines. In December 2012, UBS was fined $1.5 billion
76
for LIBOR rigging.
It was fined an additional $14.5 million by Britian’s
financial regulators for exposing customers to unacceptable risk when UBS sold an
77
AIG investment fund to customers. The Royal Bank of Scotland was fined $610
78
million by US and UK authorities in February 2013. European Union regulators
continue to investigate other banks involved in the scandal, including Citigroup,
reportedly J.P. Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, and various other European
79
lenders. The United States Department of Justice has already brought criminal
80
charges against several individual traders and may bring more.
Until March 29, 2013, it appeared that litigation arising out of the LIBOR
scandal “ha[d] the potential to be the biggest single set of cases coming out of the
81
According to Advisen Ltd., a company that researches and
financial crisis.”
analyzes underwriting, marketing, and buying commercial insurance, as of
September 28, 2012, there were eighty-eight actions filed against twenty banks,
82
including sixty-eight lawsuits and twenty regulatory investigations, related to the
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to Advisen this includes: eleven claims or investigations against Barclays; nine claims or investigations
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83

LIBOR scandal.
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, federal district judge for the
Southern District of New York, consolidated the numerous antitrust suits filed
against the LIBOR-rigging banks into one multi-district lawsuit.
Within that action, Judge Reice Buchwald divided the cases into four
categories of suits: cases brought by (1) over-the-counter (“OTC”) plaintiffs, (2)
exchange-based plaintiffs, (3) bondholder plaintiffs, and (4) Charles Schwab
84
plaintiffs.
The first three categories of cases involved class action suits, each
85
with a single lead case. The Schwab plaintiffs did not purport to represent a class
86
and initiated three separate cases within the MDL.
The OTC plaintiffs had purchased interest rate swaps directly from
87
defendants in which the rate of return was tied to the LIBOR. The exchangebased plaintiffs were various companies that traded futures contracts based on
Eurodollar futures and options on exchanges that were allegedly harmed by the
88
LIBOR manipulation.
Bondholder plaintiffs owned LIBOR-based bonds for
which they received allegedly artificially depressed amounts of interest during the
89
class period. The Schwab plaintiffs alleged injuries based on the purchase and/or
90
holding of LIBOR-based securities during the class period.
Additional plaintiffs continue to file complaints. The Court, noting that
91
“information relating to this case [will] continue indefinitely to come to light,” on
August 14, 2012 imposed a stay on all complaints not then subject to the
92
defendants’ motion to dismiss then before the Court.
On March 29, 2013, the Court issued an Order on the motions to dismiss.
The Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss federal antitrust and RICO
action claims, granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs’ commodities
manipulation claims, and dismissed with prejudice the Schwab plaintiffs
Cartwright Act claim and exchange-based plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The Court
also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law
93
claims.
The Court’s decision to dismiss the antitrust claims brought under the
Sherman Act is significant because the Court, in essence, dismissed claims brought
by three of the four plaintiff groups: holders of LIBOR linked bonds, mutual funds,

83
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94

and over-the-counter securities. The Court explained that, in order to recover on
such a claim, a plaintiff must show that its losses stemmed from a defendant’s
95
anticompetitive conduct.
The Court reasoned that, although the plaintiffs’
allegations “might suggest that defendants fixed prices and thereby harmed
plaintiffs . . . the process of setting the LIBOR was never intended to be
96
competitive. Rather, it was a cooperative endeavor . . . .”
The Court further
clarified that, “it is not sufficient that plaintiffs paid higher prices because of
defendants’ collusion; that collusion must have been anticompetitive . . . the
alleged collusion occurred in an area in which defendants never did and never were
97
intended to compete.”
The Court’s decision leaves only plaintiffs that traded LIBOR-linked
contracts on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that brought claims for violation of
the Commodities Exchange Act. The Court held that defendants, by manipulating
the price of the LIBOR, which was incorporated into the price of Eurodollar
futures contracts, manipulated the price of contracts traded on the Chicago
98
Mercantile Exchange, thus violating the Commodities Exchange Act. The Court
dismissed many of the commodities violation claims, however, finding that the
99
plaintiffs had failed to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court
acknowledged that:
[I]t might be unexpected that we are dismissing a substantial portion of plaintiffs’
claims, given that several of the defendants here have already paid penalities to
government regulatory agencies reaching into the billions of dollars. However,
these results are not as incongruous as they might seem. Under the statutes invoked
here, there are many requirements that private plaintiffs must satisfy, but which
government agencies need not. The reason for these differing requirements is that
the focuses of public enforcement and private enforcement, even of the same
statutes, are not identical. The broad public interests behind the statutes invoked
here, such as integrity of the markets and competition, are being addressed by
ongoing governmental enforcement.
While public enforcement is often
supplemented by suits brought by private parties acting as ‘private attorneys
general,’ those private actions which seek damages and attorney’s fees must be
examined closely to ensure that the plaintiffs who are suing are the ones properly
entitled to recover and that the suit is, in fact, serving the public purposes of the law
100
being invoked.

As a result of this ruling, only a portion of the claimants that asserted
commodities violations remain. Plaintiffs whose state law claims were dismissed
without prejudice may attempt to pursue those claims in state court. Plaintiffs
whose antitrust claims were dismissed must next decide whether or not to appeal
the district court’s decision to the Second Circuit.
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If the 2nd Circuit upholds Buchwald, the Libor litigation may end up resembling
securities litigation over mortgage-backed securities. After federal courts narrowed
the standing of lead plaintiffs, MBS class actions ended up being much smaller than
investors’ lawyers originally expected. The 2nd Circuit subsequently expanded
standing for lead plaintiffs in MBS class actions, but in the meantime individual
investors in mortgage-backed notes, including German banks that held tens of
billions of dollars of MBS, brought their own suits in state and federal courts.
101
We’re still waiting to see how profitable those cases turn out to be.

It is unclear what impact the Court’s ruling will have on LIBOR claims
pending in other courts, such as the case brought by Freddie Mac in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against banks that
102
allegedly manipulated the LIBOR and the British Bankers Association.
It is
also unclear whether this case will be transferred to the Southern District of New
York as part of the multi-district-litigation or whether, because Freddie Mac has
alleged distinctive breach of contract actions against the defendant banks, it will be
103
permitted to remain in Virginia on the “rocket docket.”
What is clear is that the
Court’s opinion will affect future LIBOR litigation, especially where plaintiffs
intend to allege or have already alleged antitrust claims. Moreover, the Court’s
opinion must come as a relief to banks concerned that entering into regulatory
settlements could damage them in private antitrust litigation where they would be
104
subject to triple damages.
B. Director and Officer Liability

105

As ongoing regulatory investigations seem likely to lead to individual
criminal charges, there is a question as to whether the LIBOR scandal may impact
director and officer (“D&O”) liability insurance premiums. Already, several
directors and officers suspected of playing a part in the scandal have either
106
resigned or been fired.
Banks are setting aside monetary reserves for potential
107
claims.
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A carrier’s exposure for a bank’s D&O actions will depend upon what type
of suit is filed against the bank: whether the claims filed are for antitrust violations,
108
However, for
shareholder derivative suits, securities class actions, or fraud.
now, members of the D&O insurance community do not agree on what the
potential impact on insurers and the future of D&O liability will likely be. The
regulatory fines and penalties are not likely to be covered under existing D&O
109
insurance policies.
However, Catherine Thomas, director of analytics of A.M.
Best Europe Rating Services, Ltd., stated that if the LIBOR manipulation causes
customers to suffer losses, “then there is the potential for D&O and [professional
110
indemnity] claims.”
Ms. Thomas stated that, “[o]n the [personal injury] side,
claims could come because customers are filing lawsuits because they believe
111
they’ve been mis-sold products that were linked to the LIBOR rate.”
While
warning that it is too early to predict the outcome on D&O premiums, Ms. Thomas
stated that the scandal could result in upward pressure on rates, and that brokers
and underwriters will be vigilant regarding policy wording when they renegotiate
112
policies in the future.
Although plaintiffs have filed multiple antitrust suits against various banks
involved in LIBOR manipulation, D&O carriers have experienced little exposure
113
thus far.
The only defendants named so far in the antitrust lawsuits are corporate entities and
no individuals have been named as defendants . . . . Individuals would have
coverage if they were named in antitrust lawsuits, but there is no entity coverage
under a public company D&O policy for antitrust claims. The antitrust claims by
far are the biggest potential exposure for the company, but not for their insurance
114
carriers.

Shareholders have filed derivative lawsuits against Citibank and Bank of
115
America on behalf of corporations.
These suits allege that the banks failed to
take appropriate steps to protect the bank and its shareholders from LIBOR
116
manipulation.
Although shareholder derivative suits can expose defendant
corporations and their carriers to serious financial consequences, since only three
of the banks embroiled in the LIBOR scandal are domiciled in the United States—
Citibank, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase—the overall exposure for these
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banks’ carriers may be limited.
Exposure for D&O carriers will likely arise from damages for securities
class-action lawsuits, although in light of Judge Reice Buchwald’s recent Order, it
118
remains unclear whether class-action suits will have much traction.
Barclays,
Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank each trade securities on United States securities
119
exchanges and, theoretically, their carriers could face exposure.
However, given
that the insurance industry cut back on insuring large banks prior to the financial
120
crisis, and Judge Buchwald’s recent ruling, exposure for D&O carriers seems
less likely. In light of these variables, D&O insurers may come out of the LIBOR
121
imbroglio largely unscathed.
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE LIBOR

The United Kingdom has responded to the scandal by creating a new
Financial Services Bill that will overhaul regulation of the United Kingdom’s
122
financial sector, a new Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”)
to oversee
financial services and markets in the United Kingdom, and new regulatory
123
124
authorities.
The old FSA has been abolished and has been replaced by the
125
126
Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority and the new FCA.
Martin
Wheatley, the managing director of the FSA and Chief Executive Officerdesignate of the new FCA, which is tasked with regulating financial services firms
delivering products to consumers, established an independent review of the
127
LIBOR, and generated a report of his findings.
Mr. Wheatley officially unveiled the United Kingdom government’s plan to
overhaul the LIBOR rate in his report, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final
128
Report, in September 2012.
The report recommends a “substantial package of
reforms” the purpose of which is to “provide[] a credible blueprint for the
129
restoration of trust in LIBOR.”
The report, among other things, summarizes Mr.
Wheatley’s findings in a ten-point plan for a comprehensive reform of the
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The plan focuses on creating a stronger regulatory regime to oversee
LIBOR.
the LIBOR, and institutional reform, which includes transferring responsibility for
131
the LIBOR from the BBA to a new administrative body, the FCA.
The report
recommends waiting three months before publishing the LIBOR submissions in
132
order to help prevent rate manipulation. The plan emphasizes the need for the
new administration to create a code of conduct for rate submitters with specific
guidelines requiring that submissions be corroborated by verifiable trade data and
133
subject to formal approval.
The report further recommends criminal penalties
134
for bankers who break the law.
Mr. Wheatley stopped short of urging banks to
scrap the LIBOR, stating that getting rid of the LIBOR would cause damage to the
135
many borrowers whose existing contracts rely on the LIBOR rate.
Regulators in the United States are equally interested in the future of the
LIBOR. Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, has questioned the continued
136
relative stability of the LIBOR to the European Parliament.
“Despite a long and
painful recovery, sometimes replacement is the better choice when a hip or a
137
knee . . . or even a benchmark rate . . . has worn out,” Gensler said.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is too early to predict the LIBOR’s future, it is clear that big changes
regarding the LIBOR’s regulation are in the offing: the system by which the
LIBOR is set and governed will undoubtedly be overhauled, and regulators will be
keeping a much closer eye on market manipulation for years to come.
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